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1. Introduction:  
Global warming, though happening now, will have most drastic effects in the 
future. Global warming is known to be human-caused, that is, caused by past and current 
humans. However those who will suffer most – both humans and animals – have not been 
born yet. We often hear claims, that by continuing current policies we make future 
generations worse off than they would be if we would use more sustainable practices. But 
could this actually be true? After all, people and animals that would live when we would 
use sustainable practices and those who will live if we go on with current practices, are not 
the same people and animals. There are millions of people living just one meter above the 
sea level in Bangladesh, when the sea level rises due to global warming people will be 
forced to move – as a consequence different people will meet and have children (Broome, 
2005: 404). For example, Aisha and her family would have to move from the home village 
to the metropolis, where she would meet the father of her future children. However when 
we would choose sustainable practices and sea levels would not rise Aisha and her family 
would stay in their home village and Aisha would meet a local boy and thus would have 
different children. The choice of policy itself determines who will live in the future. So 
exactly for whom and why is global warming bad? 
This is a classical example of the non-identity problem, puzzle that was described 
separately by Derek Parfit, James Woodward and Gregory Kavka in the 1980s; however it 
is mostly associated with Derek Parfit who also coined the term (Roberts, 2015). The vast 
majority of literature on the non-identity problem is concerned with accounting for future 
human generations and children, but very little has been said about the non-identity 
problem in the context of animals. The non-identity problem is also highly relevant in 
animal instances – millions of animals are born each year with particular genetic makeups 
(identity) to satisfy human needs. While in human cases the effects of creation are often 
unpredictable and accidental, like in the above example, or are clearly deviations from 
accepted behaviour, in animal breeding the effects are both deliberate and widely accepted. 
Considering non-identity issues in the animal context shows that some possible solutions to 
the non-identity problem do not work as such in all animal cases, and on the other hand, 
the animal context removes prejudices we as humans have while considering the non-
identity problem in human context.  
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In this thesis I will propose way to account for future people and animals alike in 
the context of the non-identity problem – the only way to consider future individuals 
before making identity-fixing decision is adopting de dicto understanding of future 
individuals. I will start by giving an overview of what the non-identity problem is and in 
which cases it arises in the second chapter. In the third chapter I will discuss previous 
attempts of solving the non-identity problem and apply these possible solutions to animal 
cases. The critique will largely follow David Boonin’s breakdown of the non-identity 
argument that gives rise to the problem. To better address Clare Palmer’s (2012) critique, I 
will expand one of the animal examples of the non-identity problem to show that in some 
instances it might be the breed or the species that is harmed in the fourth chapter. Such 
approach has not been used in previous discussions of the problem – however, breeds and 
species are also not immune to the non-identity problem.  
In the fifth chapter I will outline my own view. I will argue for a de dicto 
understanding of future subjects of our concern – whether it is a child, an animal, a breed 
or a species. I will defend the view that de dicto understanding is the only way in which we 
can think of future individuals before they have been conceived. I will suggest that in some 
situations and relationships, de dicto harms are enough to make the action wrong. Finally, 
in the last chapter I will discuss some potential limitations of, and objections to my 
approach. 
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2. The non-identity problem 
2.1. Future generations 
 The best and the shortest statement of the non-identity problem, which I have 
encountered and that does not depend on any examples, is presented by Elizabeth Harman: 
The non-identity problem concerns actions that affect who exist in the future. If such an 
action is performed, certain people will exist in the future who would not otherwise have 
existed: they are not identical to any of the people who would have existed if the action had 
not been performed. Some of these actions seem to be wrong, and they seem to be wrong in 
virtue of harming the very future individuals whose existence is dependent on their having 
been performed. The problem arises when it is argued that the actions do not harm these 
people because the actions do not make them worse off than they would otherwise be. 
(Harman, 2004: 89) 
So the non-identity problem is a puzzle generated by conflicting intuitions when 
dealing with future generations: on the one hand we have the intuition that the decision 
maker is doing something morally objectionable, on the other hand we cannot ground this 
intuition on a person-based approach by saying that the action is objectionable since it 
makes some persons worse off than they would have been if that decision had not been 
made (Roberts, 2015). The problem arises when the action in question – action that seems 
to be harmful for future individuals, like using current practices in the global warming 
example – is also a precondition of existence for those individuals. The original aim of the 
non-identity problem was to show that this person-based conception of harm is not always 
helpful when trying to account for people who do not yet exist (Parfit, 1986: 351). In 
following subchapters I will focus on different examples of the non-identity problem and 
instances in which it arises. Further, I will discuss person-based approach of harm itself in 
next chapter under different proposed solutions. I will grant for now that such person-based 
approach is part of our common-sense morality or as Parfit (1986: 363) has put it: “what is 
bad must be bad for someone”.  
Since the non-identity problem is about actions that concern future individuals, then 
I will now turn to the three potential scenarios that present themselves when we evaluate 
possible outcomes of a certain action for the future generations (Parfit, 1986: 356-357): 
1) Same people choices: the same individuals would exist in different courses of 
action. 
In these scenarios the identity of individuals who would exist in the future is not 
affected by the action in question. Consider Tom planting a landmine, hundred 
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years after his action a child steps on the mine and is severely injured – this child 
was born after Tom planted the mine, but this particular child would have existed 
also if Tom had not planted the mine. The same individual would have existed 
whether Tom had or had not planted the landmine. 
2) Same number choices: different individuals would exist but their number would 
be same.  
In these scenarios the identity of individuals is dependent on the action in question. 
Consider a woman who decides whether to have a second child now while her first 
child is one year old, or wait until her first child is much older. The child she could 
conceive now would not be the same she would conceive in a few years; the 
identity of her second child is dependent on her decision. However, whether she 
waits or not, she would have the same number of children. 
3) Different number choices: different individuals and different number of 
individuals would exist.  
In these scenarios not only the identity but also the number of future individuals is 
determined by the action in question. Consider China’s one-child policy: it is 
obvious that by allowing every couple to only have one child, the policy influenced 
the number of individuals existing. Without such policy at least some couples 
would have chosen to have more children. But it also influenced the identity of 
children existing – without the policy at least some couples would have had 
children at a different time, but also many couples would not have opted for 
aborting female foetuses. 1 
The same people choices scenario does not pose the non-identity problem, since the 
identity of person does not depend on a different course of action (Parfit, 1986: 355). What 
Tom does in my example has no bearing on the identity of the child who will suffer as 
result of his action. This is quite a straightforward case where Tom harms the child and 
that harm can be accounted by person-based approach, that is - Tom’s planting the mine 
makes her worse off than she would otherwise be. The same principle of harm as making 
someone worse off than they would otherwise be applies as when accounting for actions 
 
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affecting already existing people. It makes no difference whether the person suffering from 
the land mine exists at the moment of planting the land mine or comes into existence at 
some later point. 
The rest of the scenarios are two cases of the non-identity problem distinguished by 
Parfit. Boonin (2014: 1-10) adds to them a distinction between direct and indirect version 
of the non-identity problem and between “bad event” and “bad condition” cases. The 
example of the mother choosing between having child now or later falls into the category 
of direct cases – the choice that she makes determines who and how will exist in the future 
in a direct way. The example of China’s one-child policy on other hand affects future 
generations in an indirect way. Policy makers are not deliberately choosing for more boys 
to be born, nor are they choosing who exactly will get together and when their children 
will be born. However by restricting the number of children people are allowed to have, 
they indirectly influence all the above and thus change the identities of people who will be 
born in the future2. In “bad event” cases the decision maker is putting someone in certain 
bad circumstances. Future individuals themselves are healthy and their wellbeing is not 
compromised due to any intrinsic factor, but rather due to environmental circumstances, 
due to the situation they find themselves or due to events that happen to them (Boonin: 
2014: 9). In “bad condition” cases the decision maker chooses to create an individual who 
for one reason or another is born such that they have (genetic) health and wellbeing 
problems or they are predisposed to develop them later in life (Boonin: 2014: 8). 
The Same and Different Number choices can be either direct or indirect, bad event 
or bad condition cases – and any solution to the non-identity problem should be able to 
work in all of these combinations (Boonin, 2014: 10). All of these scenarios presuppose 
that the action in question is a contributing factor to which individuals will exist in the 
future. As will be shown in the following examples the problem is how to explain how an 
action can be wrong when it does not make future individuals worse off as they otherwise 
would have been, and in fact the action in question is contributing to their existence in the 
first place. 
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2.2. The non-identity problem, illustrated 
2.2.1. Hasty mother 
Wilma wants to have a child, but is informed by her doctor that she has an illness 
that as a side effect will most likely cause a significant disability to her child if she decides 
to conceive now. However her child would still have a life worth living (the disability is 
not that severe). The doctor advises Wilma to wait for a few months to make a full 
recovery and have a healthy child. Wilma decides not to wait and conceives now. Nine 
months later she gives birth to Pebbles, who as predicted has a significant disability. 
(Example adapted from Boonin, 2008: 128; 2014: 2) 
Intuitively it appears that what Wilma has done is wrong3 or at least morally 
problematic and most will find that whatever she has done wrong she has done so to her 
child, however it is less clear where to ground that understanding. If Wilma had decided to 
wait as the doctor said she should have, the child born would not have been Pebbles, she 
would have conceived a different child that would have been non-identical to Pebbles. So 
we cannot say that she has harmed Pebbles in any way. Firstly, because she has not made 
her worse off than Pebbles would otherwise have been, since if Wilma had listened to the 
doctor, Pebbles would not have existed at all. The only existence for Pebbles is as a 
disabled child and the only alternative for her is to not exist at all. Secondly, Pebbles has a 
life worth living; that is, in her life there are more intrinsically good states than intrinsically 
bad states (Palmer, 2012: 158). Latter is a non-comparative constraint to the already 
introduced person-based approach to harm. If Pebbles’s life would be worth not having – 
that is, intrinsically bad states would overweight intrinsically good states – then we could 
say that Wilma’s action harmed Pebbles in a narrow non-comparative way (Palmer, 2012: 
158).  
To be clear, in Boonin’s (2008: 128) construction of the problem Wilma has to take 
medication every day for two months to cure herself and fails to do so, since this is 
inconvenient for her. The disability her child is predicted to have and ends up having is 
blindness. However I do think that blindness might not be the best example of a severe 
disability. Not because blindness is not severe, but because it is possible to have a highly 
functional life in today’s society despite of blindness. Although Boonin (2014: 2) does 
acknowledge that and suggests one could imagine a different disability if they wish, I find 
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that his choice does influence the intuitions that are triggered throughout the discussion of 
the problem. 
Consider this real case familiar from recent news. The outbreak of Zika virus in 
Latin-America has been linked to growing cases of microcephaly – a condition where 
children are born with smaller brains and heads than considered normal. Many countries 
have recommended women to postpone having children for two years. Giving the 
assumption that Zika virus is not just correlating with but also causing microcephaly, 
would it be immoral for women to conceive within those two years anyway? Microcephaly 
has much more severe consequences than blindness of Boonin’s case, however it would be 
extremely hard to argue that such a child would have a life not worth living. If a woman 
would decide to conceive and would give birth to a disabled child, then it cannot be 
claimed that this child was harmed, because this particular child would not have existed if 
the mother had decided to wait. The healthy child that she could have had in two years is 
not identical to the disabled one she would have now. 
The non-identity problem in the hasty mother case can be phrased as such: it cannot 
be said that the mother made her child, Pebbles, worse off than she would otherwise have 
been. So if this child was not harmed (that is, not made worse off than she would otherwise 
have been) and thus was not wronged, then how can the mother’s action be wrong? The 
hasty mother example is considered to be a same number choice – the choice is between 
having one child now and having another child later. Using Boonin’s distinction, it is a 
direct case of non-identity problem – the mother influences her child’s identity directly and 
very knowingly. In this example the mother chooses to have a disabled child, thus 
choosing the child to have a specific existence and as such this is an example of bad 
condition cases. 
2.2.2. Teenage girl 
A teenage girl decides to conceive a child now rather than later in life. A most 
commonly used argument to convince her to wait before having a child is that by having a 
child now, she would not be able to give that child a good start in life. However if she 
waits, she will be able to finish her education, find a job and housing and thus would also 
be able to give her child better opportunities. The girl still decides to have a child now and 
gives nine months later birth to Tim. Tim does not have what is usually considered a good 
start in life – his family is constantly struggling financially, his mother herself is still a 
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child and he grows up without a father. Despite all the struggles Tim still has a life worth 
living. (Based on Parfit, 1986: 358; Parfit, 2011: 220) 
The example of a teenage mother is somewhat similar to the hasty mother example, 
both are same number choices and both are direct versions of the non-identity problem. 
However unlike the hasty mother, the teenage girl does not bring about a flawed existence, 
since bothTim and her other potential children would be perfectly healthy – for this reason 
many will be inclined to call her choice ‘hasty’ without wanting to say that it is immoral. 
The difference between two examples is in the external situations future children would 
find themselves in and these situations are bound to the decision the mother makes. Tim 
could not have a better start in life. Any other child to whom his mother could have given a 
better start in life, if she had waited, would not have been Tim. If the hasty mother example 
fell under bad condition case, then the teenage girl is a bad event case example. 
2.2.3. Depletion 
A wealthy society has to decide between two strategies of using its resources. If 
they choose “depletion”, their standard of living will grow over the two next hundred 
years, but due to the running out of resources, the living standard of future generations will 
drop to the level similar with today’s situation after this time. If they decide for 
“conservation”, their living standard will still grow in comparison with the current 
situation, but not as much as in the depletion scenario. However the living standard of 
future generations will still be growing in two hundred years and will be much higher than 
in the depletion scenario.  
 
Figure 1. Graphic explaining different depletion example scenarios in Parfit (1986: 362)  
The future population in the depletion scenario is not identical to the future 
population in the conservation scenario. Due to the different living standards resulting 
from the decision, different people get together and marry or the same people get together 
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but have children at slightly different times, therefore in two hundred years, the two 
populations would not be identical. So if society chooses a depletion policy, since it is 
more beneficial to them, it cannot be said that they make future generations worse off than 
they otherwise would have been, because the existence of those future people depends on 
the depletion choice. (Adapted from Parfit, 1986: 361-362; 2011: 218) 
Similarly with the teenage mother example this is a bad event case: when 
comparing the two populations, the people in both scenarios have similar health overall, 
the differences come from the situations they find themselves in and the events that will 
happen to them. These situations and events are the result of the decision of the wealthy 
society, and also a precondition for the existence of the populations in question. The first 
two examples represent a same number choice, whereas the depletion scenario can be 
reconstructed as a different number choice – the size of populations can be different as a 
result of the chosen policy. 
The depletion example is in fact strikingly similar to the issue of global warming: 
today’s societies have to make a choice concerning their way of life but those who will 
most suffer or benefit from it have not been born yet. One alternative is to go on as before 
and enjoy same or slightly growing living standards; however it is future generations that 
will be put in a bad situation and will have to face bad events, among other things lower 
living standards (Parfit, 2011: 218), but also many will be killed due to the global warming 
(Broome, 2005: 403-404). The other alternative is slightly uncomfortable for the present 
and the next generation, and will result in lower living standards for some time compared 
with the first alternative, but the generations to come will benefit from a better situation 
compared to the alternative (Broome, 2005: 404). However it is clear that like in the 
depletion scenario, the populations in the two alternatives will be different both in terms of 
their identities and number of individuals (Broome, 2005: 404).  
2.2.4. Transgenic mouse 
I will now turn away from classical examples of the non-identity problem and 
concentrate on examples based on animals. Considering the non-identity problem in the 
animal context gives new perspectives that might put the whole debate in a new light. 
Consider a transgenic mouse that was born in the laboratory and due to its genetic 
makeup will develop a painful cancer at some point in its life. The mouse itself has not 
been genetically modified - its parents were genetically altered, but the mouse in question 
Proover 
The Non-Identity Problem 
13 

was born as the result of natural breeding. This transgenic mouse will definitely have a life 
worth living, it will be provided with everything necessary for its wellbeing and once 
cancer develops, it will be given painkillers and experimental treatment and will be 
euthanized before suffering will grow too unbearable (example adapted from Palmer, 
2012: 159). 
The only reason this particular mouse exists is due to the need for such mice in 
research and the only way of existence for this mouse is with the particular genetic makeup 
that will result in suffering. There is no alternative for this particular mouse; it would not 
have been bred if research had not needed such research animals (Palmer, 2012: 161) – that 
is, without research activities this mouse would not have existed. Like in other examples, it 
cannot be said that being a research animal makes this mouse worse off than it would have 
otherwise been. Although some aspects of research can still harm this mouse (i.e. make it 
worse off), like not administering painkillers when needed or not providing it with species 
specific food and shelter, this cannot be said about it developing cancer or being bred for 
the research project. 
Unlike with other examples, the alternative for this example is not a healthier 
mouse, but no mouse at all or maybe a mouse bred for a different kind of research and thus 
exhibiting some other kind of properties that are essential to the research. Further, the 
decision maker in this case is the researcher and sometimes the decision making process 
can be complicated and involve many people on different levels. In this regard our 
transgenic mouse might be much more similar to the depletion example than to the 
examples of hasty mother and teenage girl. This example can be constructed as a same 
number choice (when alternative is to breed another similar research mouse) or a different 
number choice (when in alternative no research mouse is bred), it exhibits features of 
direct version of non-identity problem (researcher chooses to create this specific mouse) 
and also features of indirect version (when we acknowledge that there is a whole industry 
involved in contributing to creation of this research mouse), and it is an example where the 
individual in a bad condition, that is the cancer prone transgenic mouse, is created such 
that bad events will happen to it (although research itself is not necessarily  harmful for the 
mouse, it usually happens to be so). 
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2.2.5. English bulldog 
English bulldogs as a breed are known to have a much higher risk of developing hip 
dysplasia, cysts, breathing complications, vulnerability to heat stress, and have an average 
life expectancy of five to six years, which is almost half the life expectancy of an average 
dog. Health problems associated with this breed have a serious impact on the wellbeing of 
its members. Knowing this, a breeder still decides to breed her female to the male that she 
thinks is an outstanding example of the breed. Two months later Lucy is born, and as 
predicted she develops hip dysplasia and breathing complications that have some negative 
effect on her life, but not to the extent that it could be said that her life is not worth living. 
Lucy is well cared by her breeder as a puppy and later adopted by a family which goes to 
great lengths to make sure Lucy has a good welfare. Lucy dies at the age of six and a half 
years (adapted from Palmer, 2012: 159). 
As with all the presented examples, there is no alternative existence for Lucy other 
than being the English bulldog she is. Like with the mouse example, Lucy’s problems are 
embedded in her genetic makeup and there is no comparison point. It is highly unlikely 
that the person breeding English bulldogs would choose to go and breed golden retrievers 
or that the person adopting would take a retriever in place of a bulldog. It is more likely 
that no other dog or a different English bulldog would have been bred or adopted in Lucy’s 
place. The latter would still result in the same scenario as described. The former would 
mean that we are dealing with a different number case. In Boonin’s distinction this would 
be a bad condition case and it has features of direct and indirect cases. It is direct since 
there is one particular breeder who decides to bring Lucy into existence, however there are 
many more contributing parties to the fact that English bulldog as the breed has such 
welfare affecting features. Latter will be discussed in more detail in fourth chapter.  
However the intention behind creating an English bulldog is somewhat different 
from creating a transgenic mouse – the English bulldog is not bred for its health problems, 
these problems are caused by other features (like shorter nose, massive heads, low and 
massive body structure, etc.) the dog is bred for. That said, the breeding of transgenic mice 
and the English bulldogs is a widely accepted practice where animals are deliberately 
created for their welfare affecting characteristics. This makes them rather different form 
the hasty mother and the teenage girl cases which can be seen as a clear deviation from the 
norm (Palmer, 2012: 160-160). 
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2.3. Remarks on the examples 
It is important to note that the non-identity problem is always presented such that 
the knowledge of the decision-maker is crucial. If Wilma in the hasty mother example had 
no way of knowing about having a condition that will have such effects on her child, we 
could not speak of her choice as being morally wrong. Her condition could be one that 
does not cause her any discomfort and thus she might think herself to be perfectly healthy. 
In this case we would say that it was just a misfortune. It would also be a misfortune if 
Wilma decides to wait and takes precaution measures to not become pregnant, but still 
conceives a child despite everything and that child will be born with a disability as 
predicted. That is although Wilma would still be responsible in the sense that she has 
caused her child to come to existence in a particular way, she would not be morally 
responsible – roughly put she cannot be praised or blamed for her action. Without proper 
knowledge of her condition and the effects this condition would have on her future child, 
she could not be morally accountable for the effects her decision brings about. 
Climate change illustrates well the same point in indirect cases – as long as there 
was no knowledge that would suggest that human actions were causing the global 
warming, there could not be a moral responsibility. So although human activities resulting 
in pollution have started much earlier and have since been influencing the future 
generations and also who will be part of future generations, this non-identity case 
presented no moral problem. However when relevant knowledge has been acquired, the 
question about the morality of further actions can be asked.  
At the same time I would not want to say that ignorance completely frees from 
responsibility. There are instances where the person making a decision might be ignorant 
of important aspects and effects of their decision, but they are still in the position to know. 
The breeder of English bulldogs is in the position where she should be aware of common 
problems in the breed and the ignorance is not an extenuating circumstance that frees her 
from moral responsibility. Likewise a speeding driver is in position to know the regulations 
and the fact that they did not notice the road sign does not free them from moral 
responsibility as they were in the position to know. The difference with examples in 
paragraphs above is that policy makers and Wilma were not in the position to know prior 
to acquiring the knowledge. 
Despite the differences between the same and different number cases, the direct and 
indirect, bad event and bad condition cases, all th
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a common moral problem. We want to say that the agents – whether mothers, policy 
makers, researchers, breeders – have done something morally objectionable, but we cannot 
explain this in terms of wronging or harming any particular individual, in the sense of this 
individual having been made worse off than they would have otherwise been, had the agent 
acted differently. On other hand, we want to say that there should be some way to take 
future individuals into account when making decisions about which we know that they 
would affect their wellbeing or quality of life in a severe manner. 
2.4. The non-identity problem as five premises and one conclusion 
David Boonin (2008; 2014) breaks down the argumentation behind the non-identity 
problem into five premises and one, as he calls it, implausible conclusion. Boonin builds 
this conceptualisation on the example of the hasty mother, but the same can be done for 
other examples. Boonin (2008: 129-131, 2014: 3-5) uses names in his breakdown, but I 
will go with letters - M is for mother and C for child. For the purposes of my thesis I will 
merge premises 4 and 5 into one, as they often are presented as one and together describe 
“no harm, no foul” principle. 
Premise 1: M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not make C worse off 
than she would otherwise have been 
Premise 2: If M’s act harms C, then M’s act makes C worse off than C would 
otherwise have been 
(Thus: M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not harm C) 
Premise 3: M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not harm anyone other 
than C 
(Thus: M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not harm anyone) 
Premise 4-5: If an act does not harm anyone, then the act is not morally wrong 
(Premise 4: If an act does not harm anyone, then the act is not morally wrong then 
the act does not wrong anyone; and Premise 5: If an act does not wrong anyone, 
then the act is not morally wrong) 
Conclusion: M’s act of conceiving C is not morally wrong 
Before proposing my own way of accounting for future individuals in the context of 
the non-identity problem, I will give a brief overview in the next chapter of some proposed 
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solutions to the non-identity problem that deny one of these premises, and Boonin’s own 
solution, that instead accepts the conclusion. I will give an overview of what has been 
proposed to solve the non-identity problem and why proposed solutions are unsatisfactory 
in the human or animal case. Keeping in mind the work of other philosophers and 
objections to them, I will move on to propose my own way of blocking the non-identity 
argument as presented by Boonin (2008, 2014) in the fifth chapter. Boonin (2008, 2014) 
provides an excellent account of how various philosophers have attempted to solve the 
problem by rejecting one of the premises. Clare Palmer’s (2011, 2012) critique will be 
used when these solutions are put in the animal context. 
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3. Solving the non-identity problem 
3.1. Parfit’s solution  
I will start the overview of proposed solutions with Parfit’s own solution to the 
teenage mother example. Parfit proposes what he calls the same number quality claim (Q): 
If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people ever live, it would 
be worse if those who live are worse off, or have lower quality of life, than those 
who would have lived. (Parfit 1986: 360) 
The same number quality claim seems to describe the intuition people have that the 
mother could have made a better choice than she actually made (Parfit, 1986: 360). Parfit 
(1986: 366; 2011: 231) accepts what he calls no-difference view – it does not matter 
whether identity of future individuals is affected by the action or not. However, he does not 
argue that this choice is better from the point view of a particular person or from the point 
of view of the child. Instead he takes an impersonal approach and states that from an 
impersonal standpoint it would be worse if individuals who live are worse off compared to 
those who could have lived, if the decision that was made had been different. 
However Parfit (1986: 361) also argues that such approach is only plausible in 
same number choices, and as such does not solve the non-identity problem that might also 
occur in different number choices. The problem with adopting impersonal 
consequentialism is that it does not consider goodness or badness of things for any 
particular person but as net sum of goodness or badness. One possible form of impersonal 
consequentialism is “if other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there 
would be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living” (Parfit, 1986: 387). 
Adopting such impersonal consequentialist view in different number choices leads to what 
Parfit calls the repugnant conclusion:  
The Repugnant Conclusion: For any possible population of at least ten billion 
people, all with very high quality of life, there must be some much larger 
imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, 
even though its members have lives that are barely worth living (Parfit, 1986: 388). 
The repugnant conclusion is problematic for classical consequentialist approaches. 
Since the personal aspect of well-being is not taken into account, and what matters if other 
things are equal, is the total impersonal amount of happiness (or of whatever makes life 
worth living), then the classical consequentialist would have to prefer the second option – 
that is, a much larger population whose members have lives that are barely worth living. 
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However this conclusion is not satisfactory for most people, including Parfit (1986: 360) 
himself. 
Parfit (1986: 361) suggests that for solving the non-identity problem theory X 
should be accepted. Theory X is a possible theory that would retain Q in same number 
choices and would justify Q better than classical consequentialism, but also would solve 
non-identity cases in different number choices and do so without leading to the repugnant 
conclusion. Parfit’s wording of the principle Q and the repugnant conclusion suggest that 
he is nonetheless looking for a solution to the non-identity problem in the framework of 
consequentialism. The fact that one option is better implies for classical consequentialism 
that the worse option is wrong – one should always do what is better (Roberts, 2015; 
Sinnot-Armstrong, 2015). There is no room for both options to be morally permissible with 
one option being still slightly better than another.4 
Parfit’s work shows the dangers of solving the non-identity problem in the 
framework of classical impersonal consequentialism. To better account for proposed 
solutions to the non-identity problem also in other theoretical frameworks, I will use 
Boonin’s (2008, 2014) breakdown of argumentation behind the problem and follow his 
critique to possible solutions.  
3.2. Rejecting premise 1 
Boonin (2008: 134) presents this premise as the one that “sets the stage” for the 
argument, however he sets his stage slightly differently than I do. I have worded the first 
premise as: 
Premise 1: M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not make C worse off 
than she would otherwise have been 
While Boonin (2014: 3) uses: 
Premise 1: Wilma’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not make Pebbles 
worse off than she would otherwise have been 
The role of stage setting should not be overlooked, since this does influence the way the 
argument might go. By giving a name to the child, Boonin seems to be choosing the time 
when the child is already born and her identity is known and fixed, while my setting leaves 
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it open and allows to consider the moment of decision-making when the identity of future 
child is yet unknown.  
Two ways to deny the first premise have been used in the literature. Firstly, one 
may reject the premise since accepting it seems to implicitly require comparing how things 
are for an individual when she exists and how things are for her when she does not exist. 
There is some substance to this claim: comparing how things would be for Pebbles if she 
exists and if she does not exist is strictly speaking not possible – we could just compare 
alternative worlds where Pebbles exists and does not exist, however nothing can be said 
about how it would be for her. So rejecting the first premise in this way would be to say: it 
is impossible to say whether M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does or does not 
make C worse off than she would otherwise have been Boonin (2014: 30) responds that 
even if it is not possible to compare the existence and non-existence, this does not 
undermine the claim that C is not worse off: “If the incoherence objection shows that 
P[remise] 1 does not say something that is true, that is, it also shows that it does not say 
something that is false”. Since it does not show that premise 1 is false, then the claim is not 
robust enough to block the argument (Boonin, 2014: 30). 
Secondly, the premise might be rejected by making a distinction between de dicto 
and de re ways of identifying Wilma’s child. Boonin’s interpretation of the premise is de 
re: it has the particular and actual identity in mind of Pebbles as such. The de dicto 
understanding would be, instead, something like “the first child of Wilma”, where the 
particular identity of the child is not fixed – it might be a boy or a girl, it might be a healthy 
or disabled child, and the only condition to satisfy is nothing more than being the first child 
Wilma has. For example, in his original wording of the teenage mother example Parfit 
(1986: 358) uses words for roles (“mother” and “child”) and not first names (“Wilma” and 
“Pebbles”), showing that he is also aware the possible de re and de dicto interpretations.  
De dicto and de re are general terms in the philosophy of language. Caspar Hare 
(2007: 514) uses a joke about Zsa Zsa Gabor to illustrate this distinction. Zsa Zsa Gabor 
told once a reporter that she had found a way to keep her husband young. The reporter 
thought that she had found an elixir of youth to keep her current husband young, when in 
truth she was planning to marry a new and younger man every five years. The reporter 
understood her claim as de re – that is “her husband” as picking out the particular person 
she was married to at the moment. Zsa Zsa Gabor herself was referring to “her husband” in 
de dicto mode – that is, as a description which could be filled by any appropriate object. Or 
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consider the claim that “Ralph believes that someone is a spy”. The de dicto meaning of it 
would be that Ralph believes that there is at least one spy in the world (no matter who), 
while de re meaning of the same sentence it that Ralph believes, of some specific person, 
that he or she is a spy (McKay, Nelson, 2014). Thus de dicto meaning picks up a 
description, while de re meaning picks up a specific object. 
The first premise might be true when understood in de re sense, but false when 
understood in de dicto mode: 
Premise 1 de re: M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not make C (that 
is, Pebbles) worse off than she would otherwise have been. 
Premise 1 de dicto: M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not make C 
(that is, her first child, whoever he/she is) worse off than he/she would otherwise 
have been. 
So it might be argued that while Wilma did not make Pebbles worse off, she did make her 
first child worse off by conceiving him/her now rather than later. Hare (2007) and Višak 
(2013) among others are arguing for such an understanding.  
Parfit (1986: 359) rejects the de dicto reading, since although we can make the de 
dicto claim that mother’s act harms her child, “it does not explain the objection to the girl’s 
decision”5. When the child is born, her first child refers now to Pebbles, and Wilma has not 
made Pebbles worse off. Parfit (1986: 359) accepts “that there is a sense in which [the de 
dicto claim] is true”. However he also objects that it “does not appeal to a familiar moral 
principle”. Familiar moral principle is for example the person-affecting account of harm, 
however when Pebbles is born the de dicto meaning of “Wilma has harmed her first child”  
does not refer to the harms done to Pebbles, and so it does not appeal to what is bad or 
good for any actual individual. Boonin (2008, 134-135) concludes that it is unclear why 
one would prefer the de dicto meaning in premise one, when the conclusion (of non-
identity argument) could still be made in de re meaning – and thus he adopts the de re 
reading. I will discuss Boonin’s and Parfit’s objections to adopting de dicto meaning in 
more detail in fifth and sixth chapters. 
Palmer (2012: 161) considers appealing to the de dicto meaning in the animal 
context, and acknowledges that while this kind of approach could work in many human 
examples, it is insufficient in the animal examples. In human instances there are 
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alternatives in which either the person to be created (read de dicto) has better opportunities 
(like in examples of teenage mother and depletion) or would have better health and 
wellbeing (as in hasty mother example) and the decider makes their decision based on what 
is more convenient for them at a current moment. However in animal examples there is 
often no such choice: there is no alternative mouse that could be created in place of 
transgenic mouse prone to cancer (Palmer, 2012: 161). The transgenic mouse is chosen to 
be created due to the fact it will develop cancer later on (Palmer, 2012: 161). If one waits 
with breeding, it will alter the identity of mice that could be born, but not the fact that they 
will be prone to cancer. In other words, the researcher in the example of transgenic mouse 
identifies the mouse as cancer prone, not as some mouse – de dicto meaning itself includes 
the proneness to cancer which is the reason why one would turn to de dicto meaning in the 
first place. 
As I am going to adopt the de dicto meaning for my purposes then &""6
*"6# the fifth and sixth chapter of the thesis.   
3.3. Rejecting premise 2 
3.3.1. Harm as making someone worse off. 
Premise 2: If M’s act harms C, then M’s act makes C worse off than C would 
otherwise have been 
Up to this point, I have simply granted that to harm someone is to make them worse 
off than they would have otherwise been. Premise 2 defines harm precisely in this person-
affecting way; however this is not understood as a sufficient condition of harm, but rather 
as necessary condition (Harman: 2004: 107; Boonin, 2012: 53). So according to premise 2: 
action is harmful only if it makes somebody worse off than they would have otherwise 
been and this seems to be part of our commonsense thinking about harm (Boonin, 2014: 
52). Such understanding of harm is comparative: it compares two distinct states – one in 
which action is performed and second in which action is not performed; and it is a person-
affecting understanding of harm, since it compares those two distinct states from the point 
of view of the wellbeing of a person who would be affected. In the literature so far, the 
‘term person-affecting’ has been used; in light of the harms done to animals, the term 
‘individual-affecting’ (Palmer, 2012: 160) is be better fitted, since it better describes those 
who can be harmed. While not all sentient animals are strictly speaking persons they are 
nonetheless individuals who can be harmed. 
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In this subchapter I will give a brief overview of ways in which this premise has 
been rejected and the alternative definitions of harm that have been proposed. This premise 
might be rejected on the basis that there are other morally relevant ways to harm someone 
that do not necessarily make an individual worse off than they otherwise would have been. 
Rejecting Premise 2 is a twofold task – one needs to present an alternative account of harm 
that would work independently of the non-identity problem and also show that this account 
is relevant in the non-identity cases (Boonin, 2014: 54). There are roughly three alternative 
ways to define harm: firstly, one could use comparative accounts of harms similar to 
proposed, but change the point of comparison; or one could adopt non-comparative 
accounts of harm; or propose understanding of harm that has both elements of the 
comparative and non-comparative aspects (Boonin, 2014: 54). 
3.3.2. Alternative comparative account of harm 
One could adopt an alternative account of harm by changing comparison point. 
Premise 2 defines harm by comparing outcome of the action for the affected person 
between how things are and how things would have been. An alternative option would be 
to compare outcome of action for the person and how the person was before the action 
(Boonin, 2014: 57). There seem to be some instances where the alternative comparative 
account can provide a better explanation. Namely, in some cases in which whether one 
does or does not perform the action, the outcome is the same Consider for example the two 
hit man example: if hit man A does not kill X, then hit man B will – so when hit man A 
kills X, then X is not made worse off than X would have otherwise been (Boonin, 2012: 
57), but X is made worse off than X was before. But there are also cases where 
comparative account works better than its alternative. 
However even if we grant that the alternative approach should be adopted, it still 
would not solve the non-identity argument. The alternative account of harm would be able 
to reject premise 2, but only a minor revision of premise 1 would lead to the same 
conclusion as before (Boonin, 2012: 61): 
Alternative Premise 1: M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not make C 
worse off than she was before M’s act 
Alternative Premise 2: If M’s act harms C, then M’s act makes C worse off than C 
was before M’s act 
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Conclusion would still be that mother’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not 
make Pebbles worse off (Boonin, 2012: 61). Since before mother’s act Pebbles did not 
exist, then mother action cannot make Pebbles worse off (Boonin, 2012: 61). 
3.3.3. Non-comparative accounts of harm 
Non-comparative accounts of harm strive to identify different bad states that are 
bad in themselves – like for example pain is; but also account for comparative harms – 
when someone is made worse off, they have also been put in some kind of bad state 
(Boonin, 2012: 71-72). Harming someone according to non-comparative accounts of harm 
is to cause them to be in a bad state, so Premise 2 would be modified as follows (Boonin, 
2012: 72):  
Premise 2b: If M’s act harms C, then M’s act causes C to be in a bad state 
Elizabeth Harman (2004: 93) has proposed one non-comparative definition of harm: “An 
action harms a person if the action causes pain, early death, bodily damage, or deformity to 
her, even if she would not have existed if the action had not been performed”. Unlike the 
comparative account of harm, this is a sufficient condition of harm (Harman, 2004: 107). 
Boonin (2014: 73) argues that such notion of harm is too strong – it is unable to 
differentiate between bad states that make a person worse off and bad states that are 
temporary and necessary for benefiting a person. Consider the example of the surgeon:  
A doctor cuts a hole in my abdomen in order to remove my swollen appendix. Cutting open 
my abdomen causes me pain (as I recover); but if the operation had not been performed, I 
would have suffered worse pain and died very soon. (Harman, 2004: 91) 
According to comparative account of harm, what surgeon does would not count as harming 
-  it would be benefitting – he either makes a patient better off than they would have 
otherwise been or than they were before. But if one accepts Harman’s definition of harm, 
they would have to accept that surgeon’s action counts as harm. Harman (2004: 92) herself 
accepts the conclusion that surgeon is harming his patient, but adds that nonetheless this 
action is permitted and not morally wrong, since in the alternative, the patient would have 
suffered more. Harman (2004: 104) claims that there are two ways in which harming may 
be permissible and both depend on possible alternatives. Firstly, harming is permissible 
when there are strong reasons to avoid alternative action - that is, in alternative course even 
more harm is done. And secondly when there are no alternatives available, where no-one is 
harmed and harms done are not considered serious. So wrongness-constraint of what 
makes action morally impermissible – that is, morally wrong - is availability of alternatives 
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where less harm is done and consideration of how serious harm is when there are no 
alternatives. Latter is similar to what I have noted in first chapter when comparing 
blindness and microcephaly. 
To defend this account of harm, one needs to show that it is reasonable to treat the 
surgeon example as a case of harm and also to prove that while it is morally wrong for 
Wilma to conceive Pebbles, it is not wrong for the surgeon to perform the operation. 
Boonin (2014: 73-74) argues that Harman is unable to do both. It is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to provide detailed account of objections to the comparative account of harm, 
but I agree with Boonin as I am not convinced that surgeon’s actions should be counted as 
harm and that a non-comparative account of harm should be preferred to the comparative 
account.  
However even if we grant that this should be the case, further difficulties arise with 
Harman’s wrongness-constraint. Consider the example of ice cream: you have an ice 
cream that you do not want to eat and there are two children, Sally and Ben, nearby that 
would both have great pleasure from eating the ice cream. Sally is bit closer to you than 
Ben and it is bit more convenient to you to give the ice cream to Sally. If you give the ice 
cream to Sally she will have a mild stomach ache later in day, while Ben would not have 
similar problems (adapted from Boonin, 2014: 91). 
According to wrongness-constraint that Harman provides it would be morally 
impermissible to give the ice cream to Sally since there is an alternative available in which 
similar harms are not suffered, which seems to be far too strong a claim.6 I do agree that it 
is reasonable to prefer giving the ice cream to Ben and not Sally, but to claim that giving it 
to Sally is morally wrong is not what most people would agree with. And so Boonin (2014: 
91) concludes that although non-comparative account of harm might solve the non-identity 
problem it is not modest enough – it leads to even more implausible conclusions when 
taken out of the context of the non-identity problem.7 
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3.3.4. Mixed accounts of harm 
 Mixed accounts of harm are possible since there are two sides involved in 
harm: on the one hand we have the individual who is harming (mother in my example) and 
on the other hand we have the one who is harmed (Pebbles). Since there are two aspects, it 
is possible to treat one of them as comparative and other one as non-comparative. The first 
option would be to say that Pebbles was harmed in a comparative way (she was made 
worse off) while mother’s action was harming non-comparatively, second option would be 
to claim that Pebbles was harmed in non-comparatively while mother’s action was harming 
in comparative way. 
Matthew Hanser (2008: 440-441) proposes a concept of mixed account of harm, 
where harm is understood as the loss of “basic goods” and action counts as harming when 
as a result someone suffers loss of basic goods. M’s action is harmful non-comparatively 
(it is harming since it causes C to lose a “basic good”) – it does not compare consequences 
of action to no-action scenario, while C is harmed comparatively (she loses some “basic 
good”). This is a kind of responsibility driven account – M has harmed C if she is 
responsible8 for her undergoing harm – that is, if as result of M’s action C have been made 
worse off than she would have been or compared to any other baseline (Boonin, 2014: 65-
66). 
Premise 2c: If M’s act harms C, then M’s act causes C to suffer a comparative harm 
(either more than C would have suffered or more than C suffered before) 
However as has become clear in subchapters 3.2.1. and 3.2.2. Pebbles does not 
suffer comparative harm. Adding non-comparative aspect to what her mother did does not 
block the argument and it would still hold that the mother did not harm Pebbles. However 
Boonin (2014: 67) accepts that such understanding of harm and harming seems to solve the 
non-identity problem in bad event cases, such as are the depletion or global warming 
examples. In such examples where people lose something essential for them, opposing the 
bad condition cases like the hasty mother example where there is no loss. 
The second way to defend mixed account of harm is to construct harm and harming 
other way around: act is harming in comparative way, while harm itself is understood non-
comparatively (Boonin, 2014: 69). 
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Premise 2d: If M’s act harms C, then M’s act causes C to suffer more non-
comparative harm  
This alteration of understanding of harm seems to provide good grounds to say that 
Wilma’s act harmed Pebbles: she has put Pebbles into the situation where she suffers more 
non-comparative harm and blindness can be understood as such harm (Boonin, 2014: 70). 
If Pebbles would have not existed she would have not suffered this harm (she would have 
not been blind). However there are troublesome aspects with this understanding of harm. 
According to this definition of harm, every single individual born into the world suffers 
some kind of non-comparative harm during their lives (and they do not suffer these harms 
before their existence), and any individual who does not come into existence never suffers 
any non-comparative harm (Boonin, 2014: 70). So according to this definition any 
procreation would be morally problematic and harmful for those who come into existence. 
One who wants to adopt this kind of account of harm will solve the non-identity problem, 
but will also have to accept even more implausible conclusion (Boonin, 2014: 70).  


Premise 3: M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not harm anyone other 
than C 
The third premise is as much a stage-setting premise as was the first one. Although 
in many cases it is possible that someone else might be harmed by an act of conceiving – 
whether the mother herself, other siblings or society – it is argued that: firstly it is 
imaginable that no-one other is harmed; and secondly the moral intuition we have in the 
first place is not about harm done to someone else, but about harm done to the particular 
individual who owes one’s existence to the action in question (Boonin, 2008: 137-138; 
2014: 103-104). Usually this premise is used to stress the latter – that when the examples 
are first presented there seems something morally problematic in them, and not so due to 
the effect on other persons. This may be true about some human examples, but as Palmer 
(2012: 160-161) points out: it is hard to say in animal examples that someone else is 
harmed. In the transgenic mouse example we could actually claim that humans and society 
are benefitted (Palmer, 2012: 161). However there seems to be a competing intuition in the 
animal context that might hold true in some human examples – sometimes it might be the 
population that is made worse off. Since this is an important aspect to the English bulldog 
example I will explore it in the fifth chapter. 
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3.5. Rejecting premise 4
Premise four and five usually co-occur together in the form: If an act does not harm 
anyone, then the act is not morally wrong. But since different arguments have been 
employed to attack one or the other part of it, Boonin (2008: 130-131; 2014: 4) divides it 
into two different premises so that objections to each could be presented better.  
Premise 4: If an act does not harm anyone, then the act does not wrong anyone 
There are other ways to wrong people other than harming them by making them 
worse off.  The most common example of this are acts that have an intention to harm but 
fail to do so or that are done with extreme indifference about potential harm. However 
even if we change the premise to account for such acts, it does not help to solve the non-
identity problem, since in most examples intention to harm or extreme indifference is not 
present (Boonin, 2008: 139). It might be even said that in accordance with first two 
premises the decision-maker is convinced that nobody will be harmed by their decision and 
so goes on with their action.  
One way to claim that someone is wronged in a morally relevant way even when 
they have not been harmed is to say that their rights have been violated. Premise 4 would 
be modified to: 
Premise 4a: If M’s act does not harm C and M’s act is not done with the intent to 
harm C and is not done with extreme indifference to whether or not it harms C, and 
if M’s act does not violate C’s rights, then M’s act does not wrong C (Boonin, 
2008: 139) 
Since neither Pebbles nor any other individual that is object of concern in the non-
identity cases exists at the moment a decision is made, then rights in question cannot be 
held by actually existing individuals. In the context of the non-identity problem to deny 
this premise one should have to appeal to the rights of future generations which would be 
violated by the choice of Wilma in the hasty mother example. Pebbles is only a possible 
individual at the moment of decision that will make her become an actual individual, so 
one should consider what kind of right could this possible individual have that is being 
violated (Boonin, 2008: 140). A potential answer would be the right not to be brought into 
this particular flawed existence and since there is no other alternative existence for Pebbles 
as such, then this would mean a right not to be brought into existence. However as Boonin 
(2008: 140) puts it, it is not clear why this would be so, after all Pebbles will have a life 
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that is worth having. Another way to answer would be that by conceiving Pebbles Wilma 
violates rights to existence of her potential child that would be born two months later. But 
this leads to the absurd conclusion that every potential chid has the right to be conceived 
(Boonin, 2008: 140), which is even more implausible than implausible conclusion of the 
non-identity problem. 
A second strategy that has been used by appealing to rights is that it would be 
wrong to generate rights that cannot be fulfilled (Boonin, 2008: 141). For example it is 
wrong to make a promise that one knows that they cannot keep. Similarly it can be claimed 
that is wrong to bring into existence individuals who have rights that cannot be fulfilled 
(Boonin, 2008: 142)  – for example a right for adequate care and good start in life (the 
teenage girl), a right to good environment (global warming) or right to healthy body (the 
hasty mother). Firstly it is not clear whether the wrongness of promise-breaking can be 
explained by generating rights that will later be violated. There is an alternative 
explanation: making a promise that will not be kept itself violates a right a person has, 
namely the right not be given promises that will not be kept (Boonin, 2008: 142). 
Secondly, even if we accept the parallel what will follow is that we should not procreate at 
all, since it is foreseeable that every individual will have a right that will be violated at 
some point in their life (Boonin, 2008: 142).  
When we think of animal non-identity cases another weakness of rights-based 
approaches emerges. Appeal to rights seems natural when talking of humans, however the 
debate over whether and what kind of rights non-human animals have is far from being 
settled. So even if we will find a way for rights-based approaches to work in the human 
non-identity cases, it will still leave the animal cases unaddressed. In the light of animal 
examples wronging is not relevant; however I do not feel that rejecting premise 4 on that 
basis is enough to block the argument that gives rise to non-identity problem. Namely for 
this reason I treat premise 4 and 5 as one, after all what is intended is to prove that when 
action does not harm anyone, then the action is not wrong. 
3.6. Rejecting premise 5 
Premise 5: If an act does not wrong anyone, then the act is not morally wrong 
To reject this premise one needs to show that acts can be wrong without wronging 
or when treating premises 4 and 5 as one that action is wrong without harming anyone. 
There seem to be two ways to show that an act is wrong without wronging in the context of 
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the non-identity problem: firstly to claim that flawed existence in itself is intrinsically bad 
and secondly that an act is wrong since there were impersonally better options (Boonin, 
2008: 143). The problem with such solutions is that they seem to bring about further 
complications. First option appeals to the feature of some non-identity cases where the 
decision brings about flawed existence, and was introduced by Gregory Kavka (1982: 105) 
who suggested that “conditions of society or the world are intrinsically undesirable from a 
moral point of view to the extent that they involve people living restricted lives” that is, 
living a life “that is significantly deficient in one or more of the major respects that 
generally make human lives valuable and worth living.” This proposal seems to be helpful 
in the cases similar to the hasty mother example and might be adapted for the examples of 
transgenic mouse and English bulldog – that is in the bad condition non-identity cases. 
However it does not solve all non-identity cases: it does not provide a solution to bad event 
cases, like in the teenage girl and depletion examples, because in these cases the people in 
question do not live “restricted lives”.  There is also a further difficulty with accepting this 
criterion of wrongness: disability itself would be intrinsically bad and bringing about such 
child would be wrong, but that also leads to conclusion that it would be bad that there are 
disabled people (Boonin, 2008: 143). It would follow that the world would be a better 
place if there were no disabled people (Boonin, 2008: 143). 
The second option would be to claim that the overall state of affairs would have 
been better if the mother had made another choice. However, this would lead to the 
conclusion that if one can conceive a happy child (and thus better the overall state of 
affairs), then one should (Boonin, 2008: 144). The latter seems implausible due to what is 
referred as the Asymmetry (Parfit, 1986: 344; Benatar, 2006: 177; Boonin, 2014: 26): 
although most accept that there is something morally problematic about knowingly and 
intentionally bringing about a flawed existence, however most will reject that there is a 
duty to bring into existence someone who would be perfectly happy. Consider Jane who 
has a child and considers having another, she knows that if she decides to have a child her 
child would be healthy, given a good start in life and would have a happy life that would 
be considered worth living. By having another child, Jenny could create an overall better 
state of affairs. However Jane decides not to have another child, since this is slightly more 
convenient to her (example adapted from Boonin, 2014: 171-172). The choice Jane makes 
does not strike as morally problematic, in fact most will hold it as morally permissible 
(Boonin, 2014: 199): something people do on an everyday basis. 
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I have discussed other complications of such classical consequentialist account in 
the beginning of this chapter. 
3.7. Implausible conclusion 
Conclusion: M’s act of conceiving C is not morally wrong 
Boonin (2008; 2014) himself accepts the conclusion that conceiving the child is not 
morally wrong. His tactic has been to show how rejecting one or the other premise does 
not work in one or the other non-identity case and/or brings about even more implausible 
conclusions in a wider context when adopted, of which I gave a brief overview in previous 
sections. Then he strengthens his case by showing that the implausible conclusion is after 
all not so implausible, that there are number of parallel cases where a similar conclusion 
would be acceptable by most.  
One of the arguments Boonin (2014: 198-199) uses to strengthen the conclusion 
goes as follows. Jane is deciding whether to have another child and decides not to have 
another child. Most will agree that this is perfectly permissible. Betty wants to have a 
child, but is informed by her doctor that she has a permanent condition and due to this 
condition she can only conceive a blind child. Most will find it permissible to conceive 
anyway. Boonin (2014: 199) holds that both examples of Jane and Betty are similar to 
example of Wilma who has a choice to conceive now and have a blind child or conceive in 
two months and have a healthy child – and most will find that conceiving blind child in 
this case is morally impermissible. Boonin claims that since these cases are similar the 
transitivity principle should be applicable: 
P1: If you must choose between conceiving a blind child and conceiving no child, it is not 
immoral to choose to conceive a blind child (Boonin, 2014: 199) 
P2: If you must choose between conceiving no child and conceiving a sighted child, it is 
not immoral to choose to conceive no child (Boonin, 2014: 199) 
P3: If it is not immoral to choose A over B when those are the only two options and it is 
not immoral to choose B over C when those are the only two options, and if the change 
from choosing between A and B and between B and C to choosing between A and C makes 
no difference in terms of any morally relevant properties, then it is not immoral to choose 
A over C when those are the only two options. (Boonin, 2014: 201) 
C: If you must choose between conceiving a blind child and conceiving a sighted child, it is 
not immoral to choose to conceive a blind child (Boonin, 2014: 199) 
 
According to trasitivity principle it if it is not wrong for Betty to have a blind child 
and if it is not wrong for Jenny to have no child, then it follows that it is not wrong for 
Wilma to concive a blind child. Or if we want to hold that Wilma is wrong in choosing to 
have a blind child it should also be wrong for Betty to conceive a blind child rather than no 
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child and for Jenny to conceive no child rather than sighted child. And the latter is highly 
implausible. However even if one could pin-point the relevant moral difference between 
Betty, Jenny and Wilma’s choices, then one would simply prove that there is a relevant 
moral difference between the cases, but to prove that Wilma’s act is impermissible one still 
needs to block the argument giving rise to the non-identity problem (Boonin, 2014: 204). 
The transitivity principle is only meant to show that implausible conclusion is not so 
implausible after all, but the non-identity argument itself does not depend on it (Boonin, 
2014: 204).  
Boonin (2014: 190) states that when the conclusion to the non-identity problem is 
accepted the non-identity problem is not a problem anymore – there is no problem to start 
with and what is left is the non-identity argument. That is the tension between intuitions 
that was problematic is removed from the argument. 
It is interesting to note that premises in this argument are based on moral 
considerations we accept when interacting with already existing individuals, while the 
conclusion is made regarding the not yet existing individuals. Parfit’s concern was 
somewhat similar: existing person-based approaches did not seem to work when it came to 
the future generations. The tension between intuitions in the non-identity cases comes 
exactly from the fact that morality concerning existing persons is being applied to merely 
possible individuals. Boonin’s “nothing-wrong” solution just stresses and proves that 
current frameworks in use do not allow us to account for future generations when making 
decisions that will concern them.  
I am not satisfied with the “nothing-wrong” solution that Boonin proposes, but his 
critique to current possible solutions of the non-identity problem should be taken seriously. 
The nothing-wrong solution gives no tools for us to account for our responsibilities to 
future generations; it does accept the non-identity argument, but by doing so it does not 
give any moral ground for choosing between alternative courses of actions that will affect 
future generations in a significant manner. It is quite conceivable that any of our decisions 
and actions has some kind of influence on the identity of future individuals, even if not all 
such decisions will present moral questions. In the last century not only our ability to 
foresee the influence of our actions to future individuals has rapidly grown but also 
technology and knowledge have made it possible to influence future individuals in ways 
unimaginable before. Some of this knowledge seems to be highly relevant to what is a 
morally permissible action to take and what is not, and to which action is better and which 
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is worse. Boonin’s “nothing-wrong” solution only confirms the problematic situation 
highlighted by the non-identity problem: many of our current moral frameworks that are 
concentrated on present individuals do not give us the tools to take into account future 
individuals.  
  
Proover 
The Non-Identity Problem 
34 

4. Harms to population 
4.1. Changing the angle  
In this chapter I will return to the English bulldog example and expand it in order to 
introduce another layer to the non-identity cases and consider harms done on the level of 
population. I consider harms on the level of population because I will argue for adoption of 
the de dicto understanding of future individuals, however to address Palmer’s (2012) 
critique, I must also provide a way to account for cases like the English bulldog example. 
Appeal to the level of population changes the angle of the problem and some scenarios 
presented as the non-identity cases might have an unexpected solution. I will be drawing 
examples from dog breeding for several reasons. Firstly, dogs are a striking example of 
what can be achieved by selective breeding; secondly, there are local, national and 
international organizations that regulate the breeding practices; and thirdly, there seems to 
be a well accepted paradigm of breeding dogs purely for financial reasons as unethical9.  
It is often argued that breeding animals who are disabled or deformed is morally 
problematic to say the least (Palmer, 2012: 157). However if the arguments of the previous 
chapter are correct, then one cannot ground this understanding in the particular animal 
being harmed, in the sense of being made worse off than it would otherwise have been. 
The particular bulldog is not harmed by having an unavoidably flawed existence, and its 
existence itself is the result of decisions by humans: the particular breeder, but also 
breeders before her, people who want to have bulldogs and are willing to pay for the 
puppies, judges who in conformation shows10 reward dogs with features that are linked to 
health problems, and so on.  Unlike with hasty and teenage mother examples, the ring of 
people partially or directly involved in the process is much wider. One might think that 
English bulldogs or the transgenic mouse are misfortunate examples in the same way as 
hasty and teenage mother examples are atypical in human cases, however such inevitably 
flawed existence is rather widespread in animals – especially domesticated animals 
(Palmer, 2011: 46, 2012: 158-159). 
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Yearly millions of animals are bred either for their flawed existence (like the 
transgenic mouse) or for some other feature that causes certain health problems (like the 
English bulldog). In addition to research and companion animals, similar problems can be 
found in farm animals –  for example, cows that have been selected for larger milk yield 
have bigger risk of suffering from mastitis and lameness (Sandøe et al, 2009: 4); pigs 
selected for faster growth have higher risk of breaking their bones and the breeding stock 
of such pigs needs to be kept on strict diet, which means that such animals are in a constant 
state of hunger (Duncan, 2004: 93); chicken selected for rapid growth are at much larger 
risk of broken legs and lameness and the breeding stock of such chicken also needs to be 
kept on diet, resulting in feelings of hunger (Sandøe et al, 2009: 4). This demonstrates that 
in animal cases the procreative decision is often distributed among multiple different actors 
and the creation of diseases and other welfare-affecting conditions is often either the 
explicit goal (like in the example of transgenic mouse), or a foreseeable but inevitable 
consequence of the decision to breed certain kinds of animals (like English bulldogs or 
milking cows) — it is not as if, by delaying breeding, a different and healthy animal would 
be born. 
It is important to note that the species and breeds are not understood here as a set or 
a kind. Species, breeds and populations are regarded as historical entities that have a 
beginning and an end, that evolve and change throughout time, that can give rise to other 
populations (or species or breeds) or merge into others (Hull, 1976; Okasha, 2002: 193). 
Both species and breeds are population based notions in biology and in philosophy of 
biology (Okasha, 2002: 200) – population being the smallest unit, breed somewhat bigger 
(it might consist of one or more populations, subspecies would correspond in the wild) and 
species being the biggest (in dogs it is made of many separate populations, but it also may 
correspond to one population). They have properties that make them much more like 
individuals than sets or kinds, what grants a place in a species or a breed is not a list of 
characteristics, but rather relation to other members of the taxonomy in question (Hull, 
1976: 176-177; Rolston, 1985: 721).  
When it comes to the animal context there may be another intuition at play - that 
not individual animals, but an entire breed or species is harmed in the sense of being made 
worse off than it would have otherwise been. This is especially so if we look at dog 
breeding. The English bulldog hundred years ago did not look like the modern English 
bulldog – it was well muscled, leaner and had longer in legs, its head was smaller 
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compared to the body and the muzzle, though short, was much longer than we see today. 
Many of the problems common in this breed today are tied to the changes that occurred 
over time. Similar can be said about changes in German Shepherd (slopping backs) and 
Bullterrier (changes of the skull). Experts in this field often find that it is the entire breed 
that has been made worse off (Leroy, 2011: 177). When breeders breed purebred dogs it is 
not only parent animals and puppies whose wellbeing they have in mind, they also need to 
consider the breed as whole. At least this is how it should be according to numerous ethic 
codes of breed clubs, guidelines of national kennel clubs and international kennel 
organizations. 
4.2. How can one harm an entire population 
One could object to the appeal to breed- or species-based harm by saying that if one 
would breed healthy animals to healthy animals, then one would produce healthy offspring 
or that one should strive to produce only healthy animals (similarly to the same number 
quality claim) – so only the wellbeing of parent animals and offspring would be at stake. 
However, this is not the way nature works. Breeders usually do not wish to produce 
unhealthy animals and it is highly probable that this is also true in the case of English 
bulldogs, but by the time some trait is prevailing in the population and starts to negatively 
affect wellbeing of animals, the damage has already been done. 
To appreciate that it is not only the wellbeing of parent animals and offspring at 
stake, consider an example where wellbeing of neither is compromised but the population 
is nonetheless made worse off than it would otherwise have been. The popular sire 
syndrome is a situation where one male11 has too many offspring in a given population; 
indicating that breeders prefer the same dog12 – one who is usually also extremely 
successful at conformation shows – to be bred to their females (Leroy, 2011: 179). As a 
result many other males will not be used for breeding and are unable to pass their genes to 
the next generation. The numerous offspring of the popular sire need not suffer from any 
health or other issues; they might on the contrary be healthy and considered to be good 
representatives of the breed. However, problems usually start to arise in a few generations, 
when grand- and grand-grandchildren of the popular sire are being bred together, since by 
that time, it is already difficult to find individuals unrelated to the popular sire (Leroy, 
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2011: 179-180). Problems might be severe health issues or they may be mild and not affect 
the wellbeing of a particular animal much. However, damage at the level of the population 
has been already done – the gene pool has been narrowed down and this has a negative 
effect on the survival chances of the population. 
Population, breed or the species, are not in this sense separated from an individual 
animal, in the end it will be the individual animal that will be affected, but the effect does 
not necessarily mean suffering for an animal. So we might imagine that the issue in 
question is infertility – no suffering or discomfort for individual animals, but it will mean 
the end of the population. Unlike in the “Children of Men”13 scenario the vast majority of 
animals will not feel bad about not being able to reproduce. Rolston’s (1985: 724) view 
that having offspring is not in the interest of parent-animal, but in the interest of the species 
itself, seems to lend some support to the argument. The welfare of parent-animals often 
diminishes during breeding period, during pregnancy and while rearing the young, so from 
the viewpoint of the parent-animal, it is hard to claim that having offspring is in their 
interest (Rolston, 1985: 724)14.  
Appealing to the population, breed or species being harmed may appear similar to 
harming others as premise 3 presents (M’s act of conceiving now rather than later does not 
harm anyone other than C), but it is important to stress that in the context of reproduction, 
an individual cannot be viewed as totally separate from the population it belongs to. So in 
the English bulldog example, we can claim that entire breed was harmed comparatively – 
the breed has been made worse off than it would otherwise been when certain welfare 
affecting features were preferred by breeders, judges and dog owners.  
4.3. Limits of appealing to population 
The appeal to population, breed or species adds an impersonal layer to dealing with 
non-identity cases and lends a helpful insight to why some situations might be viewed as 
morally problematic. For example adding the layer of population allows strengthening the 
concern for future human generations; after all in the cases of depletion and global 
warming, it is the entire human species that is put in the situation where the species is 
worse off than it would otherwise have been.  
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However it does not solve the non-identity problem in all cases, since the same 
non-identity issues may arise at the level of populations, breeds and species. To illustrate 
this I will use Palmer’s (2012: 160) example of short-lived dogs. Short-lived dogs are bred 
to fill a specific market niche – children want to have a dog, but parents know that they 
will lose their interest soon and do not want to take responsibility of caring for the dog for 
next decade or longer. Breeder starts breeding for short lifespan so that dogs will die 
around two years of age after a short disease – by the time children lose their interest in the 
dog, the dog will die and parents will not have the burden of caring for the dog. This 
example can be understood as creating a new breed and one characteristic of this breed is a 
short life span. Therefore one could not explain what is wrong with it by saying that the 
breed (population) is made worse off that it would have otherwise been: after all there 
would not have been the population of short-lived dogs if people would have not chosen to 
create one. To account for such cases, I will argue for a de dicto understanding of future 
individuals that can also be expanded to cover Palmer’s example of short-lived dogs in the 
next chapter.  
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5. Children de dicto, children de re 
5.1. A change of focus 
In this chapter I will propose my own way of how to take future generations into 
account in the context of the non-identity problem. In order to do this, I will change the 
focus of the problem. In the growing body of knowledge and developing technology it 
seems questionable that we should not take future individuals into account at all as 
Boonin’s solution suggests. It is highly conceivable that many of our actions will among 
other things fix the identity of future individuals, but what raises moral questions in the 
non-identity cases is fixing the identity in a way that affects the wellbeing and quality of 
life of future individuals. If we want to reason about whether a certain identity-fixing 
decision (going from de dicto to de re) – that is whether decision that will fix identity of 
future in particular way – is morally acceptable or not, then we cannot base our judgment 
on the identity itself (de re), since identity itself is not fixed at the moment of reasoning, so 
we will necessarily have to turn to the de dicto sense of “future individuals”. My interest is 
predominantly in this moral aspect that the non-identity cases may present, that is, in the 
morality of making an informed decision that concerns future individuals in an identity-
affecting way. The person making the decision has to know the facts about how his 
decision will affect future individuals in a relevant way. To justify the de dicto approach I 
will need to start with reconstructing the non-identity cases. 
Although many thinkersandpeople, who have not considered the problem before, 
construct non-identity cases as though the person making the decision knows the identity 
of individuals affected by it, no such knowledge is available to the decision-maker when 
the decision is made. In the hasty mother example Wilma cannot know the identity of her 
child. That is, Wilma cannot know who her child will be - all she knows is that whoever 
she conceives, will be her child. So “her child” has to be understood in a de dicto meaning 
(not a de re meaning, how it is usually represented), even when Wilma says something like 
“I will name my child Pebbles” or “My child will have good life” or “I will love my child” 
etc. The child in a de re sense would be a particular, concrete child – a child with fixed 
identity, such as Pebbles. The de dicto meaning would be, for example, the fourth child of 
Wilma, whoever that might turn out to be, where particular identity is not essential to the 
meaning. In our example, only the de dicto meaning is available since the identity is not 
fixed yet - this fourth child might be Pebbles or it might be Rock or such a child might 
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never come into existence at all. When the doctor informs Wilma about her condition and 
how it will affect her future child should she conceive within two months, the doctor is 
also referring to her child in the de dicto sense – whoever Wilma will conceive within two 
months, he is not talking of Pebbles as such. Before conception it is hard to have any other 
meaning in mind than de dicto whether in human or animal cases. The identity is not just 
unknown, but there is no identity to speak about, the identity has not yet been fixed. 
Parfit (1986: 351) claims that identity is dependent upon time of conception and 
parents’ identity – that is whose sperm fertilizes whose ovum and when. Behind this claim 
is the simple fact that it takes two specific cells to create a life and changing one of them 
(by changing time or parent) will result in a different life. In his earlier work, Parfit (1982: 
115) was quite strict on time dependence, but he later relaxed his view and allowed that 
conception must take place within a month, so that we could claim that the same person 
would have existed (Parfit, 1986: 351). However this is a highly simplified view. Although 
on the female part there is usually one fertilizable egg – and this is so for humans, dogs and 
cats for example have multiple eggs released - males (in most of the species) have millions 
of spermatozoon released per mating. Which one of those millions fertilizes the egg cell is 
pure chance. From which we can conclude that even having sex at one given time still 
leaves open millions of different outcomes15. Or as Hare (2007: 520) puts it, conception 
usually involves “split-second timing“. Based on that, I will claim that there is no specific 
identity we could possibly have in mind before conception. The only way to even think 
about future children and therefore account for our responsibility towards them is to accept 
the de dicto sense of them.  
The time-dependency claim should not be understood as reducing someone’s 
personal identity to their genetic identity. Certain genetic identity that one gets at 
conception is a necessary condition for personal identity (Parfit, 1982: 115; Parfit, 1986: 
351), but it is in no way a sufficient condition. If we think of identical twins then it 
becomes clear that in addition to the genetic identity, spatiotemporal unity and continuity 
are also essential (Hull, 1976: 177). And when we consider the genetically modified 
organisms then we have to admit that for example a mouse before genetic modification is 
the same mouse after the genetic modification, despite the fact that its genome has been 
 
	
 G&""  :&' :  "  &*"#: *"# #
#     "     #$' 6* 5   "$ :# 6$ 
* %&:   *        :#  * # $
6'
Proover 
The Non-Identity Problem 
41 

modified. Rather, the time-dependency claim shows that for Pebbles to be Pebbles it is 
necessary, among other things, that she is created with a certain genetic identity, and that 
identity is dependent on the time of conception. Conception itself is a starting point from 
which we can talk of Pebbles as such. 
5.2. Uncertainty about numbers 
To complicate the matter - it is not just identities of future individuals that are not 
fixed and are concealed from the decision-maker, the number of future individuals is also 
unknown. Dividing non-identity cases into Same Number and Different Number Choices is 
simplifying the matter based on human reproduction – in the vast majority of cases it is 
impossible to know at the moment of decision how many individuals the outcome in 
different alternatives will affect. 
To show that this distinction is based on human reproduction consider the English 
bulldog example – Lucy was not the only puppy born, she had siblings. While humans 
usually have one child at a time, dogs, depending on the breed, may have more than a 
dozen puppies in one litter. However it is impossible to know beforehand how many 
puppies will be born. When a breeder has to make a choice whether to breed her female 
now or in half a year she has no way to know how many puppies could possibly be born in 
either scenario. And even though humans and some other species mostly have one 
offspring per pregnancy, there is still a chance of having twins16.  
At the moment of decision-making neither the identity nor the number of future 
individuals are known to the decision-maker; and both the identity and the number of 
future individuals are dependent upon the decision made. The person making the decision 
has no way to know how many individuals will be affected by the decision and what their 
identity will be. However the relevant information may be available to the decision-maker 
after all. Suppose Betty is a breeder of golden retrievers. Unlike the English bulldog, this 
breed is considered relatively healthy and has longer life expectancy – she has multiple 
options available for the next breeding of her female17. She could breed her now, but since 
the female has been on medication for the past few weeks, the veterinarian suggests 
waiting because medication could cause health problems to puppies. She could wait and 
breed her in six months; she also has a choice of potential sires. She could use the male 
who lives nearby, who has passed all the health checks, but who has before produced 
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puppies with heart issues. She could also use a male she owns, but who is too young to 
have his health checks. Finally, she has the option of using a male who has been health 
checked and has not produced any unhealthy offspring, but due to the distance it will have 
to be by using artificial insemination. So in this scenario Betty does not know how many 
puppies each option would give, though statistically it is known that fewer puppies are 
usually born from artificial insemination than from natural breeding. Since she does not 
know this, then the number of puppies should not influence her decision, and the same 
goes for the identity of puppies. The facts that she knows are: in the first scenario there is a 
big chance that puppies born will have health issues; in the second case there is some 
chance that some puppies will have heart problems and even if all should be clinically 
healthy they still may carry the gene for these problems; in the third case she does not 
know whether the male is healthy himself – if he is not then she could have puppies with 
potential health problems; in the fourth case she has no foreseeable issues. She knows that 
in all the scenarios puppies might have unexpected issues and she knows that in all 
scenarios she will be responsible for the puppies. “Puppies” here should be understood in 
de dicto sense.  
Hare (2007: 521) also holds that de dicto mode has the “neat feature” of addressing 
the distinction between same and different number choices: it does not matter whether 
Wilma brings about more or less children, all that matters is that she makes things de dicto 
worse for her child(ren). Similar is Višak’s (2013: 98) account of de dicto harm: “An 
outcome is better (worse) if and only if it is better (worse) for people, whoever they are”. I 
want to claim more than that de dicto mode looses difference between different and same 
number choices. Considering the example of golden retrievers again, it shows that before 
conception the number and identities of puppies are not fixed and unknown, so both of 
these aspects – number and identity – are covered by de dicto meaning. One can only refer 
to them (future children, future puppies, future distant generations etc.) in the de dicto 
sense. 
What Betty and any other breeder needs to keep in mind while considering the 
options are the welfare of actual parent animals, the wellbeing of the actual breed (or 
population) as such and the welfare of future puppies. Welfare of actual parent animals 
need and should not be compromised and is covered by Premise 3 (Premise 3: M’s act of 
conceiving now rather than later does not harm anyone other than C), while the wellbeing 
of actual breed was discussed in the third chapter. However in all the non-identity cases 
Proover 
The Non-Identity Problem 
43 

the welfare, wellbeing and/or quality of life of future beings seem to be the key features. 
The focus of the non-identity problem would be: identifying the wrongs of fixing identity 
of de dicto individuals in welfare, wellbeing and/or life quality affecting ways.  
5.3. Harming de dicto individuals  
What is crucial for blocking the non-identity argument is the following: the de dicto 
meaning allows claiming that decision-maker is in some way making the de dicto 
individuals worse off than they would have otherwise been, by fixing their identities in 
certain ways that affect their welfare, wellbeing and/or quality of life. When the de dicto 
meaning is adopted, and in previous chapter I gave reasons why it should be adopted, we 
can no longer claim that no one is harmed by the mother’s act of conceiving now rather 
than later. As mentioned in subchapter 3.2. Parfit (1986: 359) has rejected de dicto 
meaning by claiming that it does not rest upon any familiar moral principle. 
Caspar Hare (2007) addresses this particular objection in his article and drawing 
upon two examples he shows that considering de dicto harms is not alien to our morality. 
The first example Hare (2007: 516) presents runs as follows. Tess is a state safety inspector 
whose job is to regulate safety concerning aspects of cars. She implements some tough 
regulations after it becomes clear that people in her state do not wear seat belts. And year 
later she learns that regulations have been effective and as result of wearing seat belts the 
injuries people get in car crashes are less severe than a year before. She has done a good 
job. 
Hare uses the example of Tess the safety inspector, as a parallel case for Wilma. 
Hare (2007: 517) holds that like Wilma’s decision influences the identity of the child, 
Tess’s decisions will influence who ends up in an accident – all the minor changes like 
obligation to fasten the seat belts will have an effect on who ends up in an accident, since 
“accidents involve split-second timing”. However what is clear from this example is that 
Tess is considering minimizing harms to de dicto individuals, her job is not to make it 
better for any particular individual, but to whomever ends up in the accident. 
The second example Hare (2007: 518) uses is of a cancer researcher who develops 
a cancer cure that ten years later after becomes available to the public and saves lives of 
people who suffer from cancer. Hare again treats this case as parallel to the non-identity 
cases: since getting a cancer is matter of chance and coincidence it may be that some of the 
people who benefit from the cure would not have developed cancer in the first place if the 
cure would have not been invented. Again like with Tess the safety inspector so should 
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cancer researcher be concerned with making things better for de dicto cancer patients that 
is to whoever ends up having cancer. Both examples illustrate that although we do not take 
de dicto harms and benefits into account most of the time, it does not mean that they are 
never significant – there are situations when it is appropriate to consider them in our 
commonsense morality (Hare, 2007: 516).  
The objections (Boonin, 2014; Wasserman, 2008) to Hare can be summed up as: 
there is no reason to think that we should prefer de dicto over de re meaning. Boonin 
(2014: 36-37) and Wasserman (2008: 530) argue that Tess and cancer-researcher are not 
parallel cases to the non-identity example of hasty mother, that there are significant 
differences between the examples, and since they are not parallel cases there is no reason 
to prefer de dicto reading in the non-identity cases. However I use Hare’s examples to 
simply show that considering de dicto harms and benefits is not an unfamiliar moral 
principle as Parfit (1986: 359) claimed. Reasons for adopting de dicto meaning in the non-
identity cases were presented in the last two subchapters. So my argumentation for 
adopting the de dicto meaning does not depend on whether cancer researcher and the safety 
inspector examples are or are not on par with the non-identity examples. 
Boonin (2014: 33) acknowledges that while speaking de dicto, things might be 
better for accident victims, de re people who end up in accidents are made worse off than 
they would have otherwise been. He also notes that focusing on making things better for de 
dicto individuals one could reach potentially absurd conclusions: for example, in order to 
make accident victims de dicto better Tess should be concentrating on healthy people 
having accidents since they will be healthier after the accident than those who have poor 
health to start with (Boonin, 2014: 35). 
Most critique of de dicto harms turns out to be critique of making de dicto 
individuals better off – one could benefit de dicto individuals and at the same time make de 
re individuals worse off. Similarly like Zsa Zsa Gabor was bettering the situation for her 
husband de dicto by marrying new man every five years, but making her husband worse 
off de re. Future individuals, understood in de dicto sense, are in some sense conceptual 
beings, not concrete ones, and usually we have very little knowledge available about them. 
Even though mostly de dicto meaning is abstract, sometimes decision-makers have the 
access to relevant information about welfare, wellbeing and/or quality of life affecting 
aspects of their decision on the de dicto individual. Wilma is told by her doctor that her 
decision to conceive now will most likely cause her future child to be blind – there is a 
Proover 
The Non-Identity Problem 
45 

clear alternative by waiting just a few months. Due to the fact that Wilma has decided to 
become a mother, she already has generated a special responsibility toward her child, 
which manifests itself also in avoiding harm to her de dicto child.  
Focusing on avoiding harm to de dicto individuals does not seem to bring about the 
same consequences (unless one views bringing into existence itself as benefiting). 
Avoiding making de dicto individuals worse off does not necessarily mean that one should 
strive to make de dicto individuals as better off as possible. To say that Wilma should have 
waited with conception in order not to give birth to a disabled child, does not mean that 
Wilma should strive to produce as healthy and happy a child as possible – which could 
include waiting for years until technology and laws allow for genetic manipulations and 
selections or choosing a mate based on his genetic make-up. Avoiding harm is prioritised 
in most existing moral theories and although one might say that by avoiding harms – that is 
in this case having a healthy child – one makes de dicto individuals better off, the focus 
should be still on avoiding harms and not on benefiting. So while one should consider 
avoiding foreseeable and avoidable harms to future generations, one is not obligated to 
seek ways to maximally benefit them.  
Parfit (1986: 359) and after him many other philosophers presuppose that „to bring 
someone into existence“ is benefiting them. Hand in hand with this goes the notion that 
death is harm through deprivation. Since all living beings will once die and if we treat 
death as harm and avoiding harm should be prioritized as most of existing moral theories 
claim one could reach quite an implausible conclusion. David Benatar (2006) has taken 
this view to extremes and argues that in the light of non-identity problem we should not 
procreate at all (any life is wrongful).  I want to adopt the alternative18 that „to bring into 
existence“ does not benefit the one who is brought into existence. I view existence and 
non-existence both as neutral states: any life begins with birth (or conception if you like) 
and any life ends with death – it is the framework of life19. Accepting non-existence as a 
neutral state allows prioritising avoiding harm without deeming all procreation as 
wrongful. 
In this subchapter I have introduced a notion of de dicto harms: I have used Hare’s 
examples to answer Parfit’s claim that de dicto reading suggests unfamiliar moral principle 
and I have made a distinction between avoiding harm and benefitting to reply to Boonin’s 
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critique. Although accepting the de dicto meaning and avoiding harming de dicto 
individuals is a helpful tool to take future generations into consideration, it has its 
limitations which I will discuss in the sixth chapter along with further objections to 
adopting the de dicto mode.  
5.4. Expanding a familiar principle 
Why should Wilma consider de dicto harm when there will be no de re harm? It is 
generally accepted that parents have special responsibilities toward their children – such as 
to care for them, provide for them and keep their best interest in mind. There is some 
debate over what are the grounds for these special responsibilities and are they special or 
not, however our common sense morality and laws of many countries maintain that there 
are special responsibilities. One way to make sense of these special responsibilities is to 
see them as generated by the relationship between parent and child. It has been well 
accepted that this parent-child relationship itself can begin at conception or later for 
example when child is adopted.   
The parent-child relationship that begins with or after conception20 has no identity-
fixing nature – such relationship starts with a particular child, whose identity (at least as an 
individual genetically distinct from others) is already fixed. There is a being, albeit in a 
very early state, to which we can in principle refer in our thought and talk, and who will be 
affected by whatever we do as parents. The same holds true for most adoption cases – even 
if adopting parents must have in mind a de dicto child when considering whether to adopt 
and whether they could provide for the child and whether they are ready to have a child in 
the first place, the adoption process itself mostly lacks identity-fixing features. The actual 
child exists regardless of the parent’s decision to adopt and which child to adopt. If Wilma 
would decide to adopt a blind child then this decision does not affect the identity of the 
child who will be adopted, the identity of this child was fixed long before and 
independently of Wilma’s decision. Wilma’s decision makes this particular child with an 
already fixed identity her child. However, should Wilma’s decision affect the identity of 
her adoptive child in similar way to the hasty mother example, the case would be different. 
For example, if Wilma wanted to adopt the child and paid for a woman to conceive the 
child, even knowing that conceiving now would mean that the child will be born blind 
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while delaying conception for two months would produce sighted child, then her decision 
would have identity-fixing nature. 
Roughly starting with conception we can start talking of beginning of parental 
responsibility toward a particular individual, we can talk of de re responsibility. On the 
other hand, the de dicto sense of “my child” gives the possibility to say that the mother has 
a special responsibility toward her child due to the relation between them, even before 
there is an actual child with a particular identity who will stand in relation to her parent. So 
with cases similar to the hasty mother and the teenage girl, using a de dicto meaning of 
“my child” allows to bring the starting point of relationship between mother and child 
before conception. Wilma’s relationship with her (biological) child begins at the moment 
she decides to become a mother, when her child can be talked about only in the de dicto 
mode – since there is no de re sense available at all. Wilma puts herself into the role of 
mother and through this into the relationship with her yet nonexistent child, and with this 
she generates the special kind of responsibility toward her de dicto child.  
However not all parent-child relationships can be understood as beginning before 
conception, there will be those that begin much later. Consider the news report of an older 
woman who had no luck with having children and who was about the age of menopause 
and who at this age conceived a child without realizing so. Given the knowledge available 
to her and the context she finds herself in, it seems that her relationship with her child 
starts after conception; in fact she becomes aware of her child few hours before the child 
birth. Likewise, the pre-conception relationship is not something that, for instance, all 
fertile women have just because they are fertile – this would lead to many dubious 
conclusions. But we would have reason to talk of this kind of relationship in the following 
cases: when an agent is seriously planning to have a child (like the teenage girl) or when an 
agent is aware about some kind of problem that would affect her future offspring. Consider 
Wilma not planning to have a child but, due to illness, she goes to see a doctor who 
informs her that her illness would cause her child to have a serious disability should she 
conceive now, and that it would be better for her to use contraceptives during that time. 
Now it seems that Wilma has been put into a situation where she has to consider a 
responsibility toward her future children, understood in de dicto mode. 
Such understanding can be expanded to future generations and to animals. Decision 
that a breeder makes is similar to the decision parents make when they decide to have 
children – both are procreative decisions, but in the context of the non-identity problem 
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both are also identity-fixing decisions. The breeder’s relationship with her puppies begins 
when she starts planning particular breeding and her relationship with the breed itself 
begins when she gets involved with the breed for the first time. Adopting this relation-
based approach expands the familiar principle that parents have special responsibilities 
toward their children, but also explains why people find that sometimes parents have 
special responsibilities toward children that do not yet exist. The principle could be 
formulated as: the relationship we have to future generations generates special 
responsibility toward them. One is responsible for the life one creates, even when the 
creation is only planned. 
When it comes to non-direct identity-affecting decisions where many people are 
involved in the process, the starting point of relationship between the decision-makers and 
future individuals is hard to determine, but it is present at the latest by the time the identity-
affecting decision is considered. In the depletion example at latest such responsibility-
generating relationship is present when society is presented with relevant information 
about how alternative policies might affect future generations – and as with the hasty 
mother and teenage girl example “future generations” has to be understood at that moment 
in de dicto sense.  
In previous chapter addressed Parfit’s critique of de dicto harms not being part of 
our morality and showed that in some scenarios it is common to consider de dicto harms. I 
have now further addressed Parfit’s critique by expanding familiar principle of parental 
special responsibilities toward their children, which allows me to claim that the non-
identity cases are often the kind of scenarios where we should consider harms to de dicto 
individuals. Firstly, the de dicto is the only available way to account for future individuals; 
there simply are not de re individuals yet. Secondly, decisions that fix the identity of de 
dicto individuals are somewhat similar to the procreative decisions of parents. 
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6. Objections and limitations 
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This is an objection presented by both Parfit (1986: 359) and Boonin (2008: 134-
135) against adopting a de dicto understanding. Both claim that since the de re child was 
not harmed in hasty mother example and the de dicto harm would not be relevant, the non-
identity argument will still hold. As I have already argued the de dicto mode is the only 
understanding of future individuals we can adopt before making an identity-fixing 
decision, so we cannot dismiss a de dicto understanding so easily. When we accept that 
Wilma has harmed her de dicto child, then we cannot claim that Wilma’s act of conceiving 
now rather than later does not harm anyone: it does harm her de dicto child. The question 
will be then whether this harm is significant enough to deem Wilma’s action as morally 
wrong. I am not convinced that this should be the conclusion we reach, however I would 
hold that in the moment the decision is made and in the relationship this decision is made 
such harm is significant enough to say that, due to this harm, the decision and action 
Wilma makes is at least morally problematic. That is the de dicto harm is significant 
enough to block the non-identity argument. Whatever else we want to do with the 
argument – stipulate less radical conclusion to be to better accommodate intuitions of 
people, or adopt some other notion of harm, or claim that a child has been wronged – we 
must accept the de dicto reading first. 
Boonin (2014: 32) also claims:  „The significance of P[remise]1, after all, is that it 
helps to justify the further claim that since Wilma’s act does not harm her child, it does not 
wrong her child“ and „the claim that P[remise]1 is false in the de dicto sense will be robust 
enough to solve the non-identity problem only if we add to it the further claim that if 
Wilma’s act harms her child in the de dicto sense then it wrongs her child”. However this 
is claim is not easily defended in the animal-context, as the problem of non-identity can 
arise also in the animal context and the argument Boonin presents should thus also work 
for animal context. But the debate over whether animals have rights and what kinds of 
rights they have is far from being settled. Thus whether and how animals can be wronged 
is an open question, although it is uncontroversial accepted that animals, or to be more 
precise all sentient beings, can be harmed. 
In the light of the ongoing debate about animal rights, Boonin has three options to 
address this issue a) to conclude that his argument does not work in animal cases, since it is 
highly dubious that we can say with full certainty that harmful action wrongs animal, and 
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so his argument leaves vast number of non-identity cases unaddressed; b) to claim that his 
argument works in animal cases and accept the consequence that this would mean that 
most of harmful actions toward animals are not wrong since they do not wrong animals; c) 
claim that wronging is not so important and that what is important is that action that harms 
is wrong. Latter however would leave the door open to my claim that de dicto harms can 
be in certain circumstances and relations significant enough to be wrong. This is the view 
that I have defended in previous chapters. I would prefer that the argument would not 
depend on rights and this view has benefit on not hanging on the moral status of animals; 
simply the fact that they can be harmed is enough for it to work.  
6.2. Backward-looking 
When dealing with the non-identity problem I am predominately concerned with 
decision-making process before conception: I’m interested in the future-facing aspect of 
non-identity problems. However there is also a backward-looking side to the non-identity 
problem or as Parfit (1986: 360) puts it: if an action is wrong at time t1 (before 
conception), it has to be wrong at time t2 (say when the child is 3 years old) and t3 (as an 
adult). So if one wants to claim that the act of bringing a child into existence is wrong, then 
it has to be wrong also when that child has grown up. This objection is connected to the 
previous one: de dicto harm does not count when de re individual is not harmed.  
It is true that the particular child – Pebbles – cannot say that her mother harmed 
her, the same way generations living in distant future cannot say that current generations 
have harmed them by choosing policies they did (unless one is also inclined to adopt a 
different notion of harm). However it might still be said by Pebbles and future generations 
that the decision made was bad or morally problematic or wrong. And it was wrong due to 
the decision-makers harming de dicto individuals they should have been taking into 
account while making the decision. People living two hundred years from now may well 
say that policy-makers made a bad decision and that due to that decision they are in a bad 
situation. If another policy had been adopted they might not have existed but whoever 
would have existed would have been in better situation compared to them. Similar goes for 
Pebbles: she can say to her mother that she made a bad decision; she cannot say that she as 
Pebbles was harmed, however she could say as representative of the concept “Wilma’s 
child” that by making such hasty decision Wilma harmed “her child” by making “her 
child” worse off than she would have been, if for instance she would have been conceived 
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two months later. Or to use Hare’s words (2007: 523) Pebbles could say: “You failed to 
show appropriate de dicto concern for your child, and I am your child”. 
This is not a new way of thinking: for instance dog breeders who have bred a litter 
that experienced health problems tend to acknowledge that the decision they made was a 
bad one, despite the fact that they care about every dog that was born. If Wendy the 
Golden Retriever breeder in the example above would choose to use her own young male 
for breeding and would have ended up with litter where at least some of the puppies suffer 
from health problems, she could still acknowledge the wrongness of her decision. However 
people usually are having troubles admitting their mistakes and it is especially evident in 
human cases of the non-identity problem that it is difficult for decision-makers in similar 
situations to acknowledge their error. But this difficulty to acknowledge one’s error does 
not make the action in question right. The animal context of non-identity problem shows us 
that one is less resistant in accepting that action was morally wrong or at least morally 
problematic, which might suggest that we are facing a kind of prejudice when we have to 
consider similar actions toward members of our own species. 
In bad event cases such as global warming one might also is appeal to the species or 
population level. People living two hundred years from now can say that the species Homo 
sapiens was made worse off than it would have been. Native Americans can similarly 
claim that their tribes or populations (and they were separate populations until the 
colonisation) were made worse off by colonisation due to the fact that we can treat tribes as 
historical entities. By belonging to the same tribe or population they could demand 
retribution for the harms done. In this sense, colonisers with their actions incurred 
responsibilities towards future Native populations, but such responsibilities can only be 
understood de dicto, since most colonisers’ actions were identity-fixing actions. 
6.3. When there is no alternative 
Appealing to the de dicto harms helps to make sense of the hasty and teenage 
mother examples and also the depletion case – that is in cases where there is a clear 
existential alternative. The reason why this is so is not due to limitedness of de dicto mode, 
rather the comparative account itself demands a point of comparison and the de dicto mode 
does provide it in such cases. However animal cases present scenarios where there is no 
such alternative – many animals are created for their “disability” or are not created at all. 
In some instances adopting de dicto meaning will mean that if there is no alternative, then 
the action is permissible. Consider for example the case of Betty who learns from her 
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doctor that any child she will conceive will be blind – this is a permanent and incurable 
condition, and waiting few months or few years will not make any difference. As Boonin 
(2014: 25) claims based on his class room surveys most will find that it is permissible for 
Betty to have a blind child. However in some instances the disability might be so severe 
that we would hesitate before calling such a procreative decision permissible. In these 
cases, it seems that what we in fact do, or at least should do, is to broaden the de dicto 
meaning of “child” in “she should have a healthier child” from biological children to 
include adopted children as well. And this would be true also for many animal instances 
where we could ‘zoom out’ the de dicto meaning from “research mouse” to “mouse” to, 
eventually, “living creature”.  
This is not in itself adding a new principle to simply solve the non-identity cases: 
the formulation of the problem itself suggests that besides comparative account of harm 
that is “making someone worse off than they would have been”, a non-comparative 
element is at use also, namely the life created has to be worth living. So while mostly we 
use comparative account of harm, it is nonetheless constrained by a non-comparative 
condition. So while in most cases when considering de dicto meaning one will be using 
relatively narrow de dicto meaning (like “her child” or “future people”) when using 
comparative account of harm, then in some cases the possible outcome has so serious 
effects that we seem to doubt whether such life will after all be worth living. And not just 
worth living: it seems that we want life not to be just merely worth living, but well worth 
living. And in cases where it is doubtful whether life is well worth living, we seem to want 
to broaden the de dicto reading to cover more potential alternatives. 
In animal no-alternative cases, there is another way to think about the issue, namely 
consider harms at population level. English bulldog as such does not need to have health 
problems, it has been selected for welfare affecting features and through that harm has 
been done to the breed and through that also to it members. At some point in the history of 
breed harm was done to the population, at some point harm was done to de dicto 
individuals (when puppies were chosen to be bred for welfare affecting features over 
potential puppies without those features) and by now welfare affecting features are so 
common in the breed that they have become a hallmark of entire breed. We can still say 
that breeders should strive to avoid de dicto harms to the future individuals of English 
bulldog and also that they should avoid further de re harms to entire population.  
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In the example of short-lived dogs the breed can also be understood in a de dicto 
sense before any breed is created, and so creating such short-lived breed would mean 
making de dicto breed worse off. When one decides to create a breed then again one 
cannot have any de re breed in mind, but only de dicto breed. By this we have comparison 
point: one could create healthier and more vital breeds than the short-lived dogs. For 
example among other things it would be worse off for a dog breed to be short lived since 
dog as a species is adapted to longer reproduction cycles, while breeding for short lifespan 
would not change reproductive cycle and would put genetic diversity of population at great 
risk. 
6.4. Does it solve all variations of non-identity cases? 
Firstly, the aim of this thesis was not strictly speaking to solve the non-identity 
problem, so I will not be reconstructing the argument. The aim of this thesis is rather to 
show that the only possible way to account for future individuals is by appealing to de 
dicto understanding of future individuals, and this is enough to block the argument. 
However I will still consider whether my proposal is robust enough to block the argument, 
independent enough to be applicable outside of the problem, and modest enough not to 
bring about even more implausible conclusions. Boonin (2014: 10) also holds that any 
proposal should work in all the non-identity cases: in the same and different number 
choices, in direct and indirect versions, in bad event and bad situation cases.  
As I have shown in chapter five the de dicto mode satisfies the independency 
requirement – it is a well known term in the philosophy of language, the de dicto - de re 
distinction is independent of the non-identity context. Hare (2007) has also pointed out that 
considering de dicto harms is not an unfamiliar principle as Parfit suggested (1986: 360). I 
have also justified and shown that before conception it is the only available mode to think 
about yet not existing future individuals. I have argued that the de dicto understanding of 
future generations does not stand only for all the possible identities but also for different 
potential numbers of individuals – so same and different number choices should be treated 
the same way, the decision-maker should be concerned that their decision is not worse for 
whoever will be caused to exist (Višak, 2013: 98).  
I have suggested that de dicto harms in certain relationships might be sufficient to 
make the action wrong and thus would make such reading robust enough to block the non-
identity argument. However different justifications can also be possible, Hare (2007; 2013) 
Proover 
The Non-Identity Problem 
54 

for example favours an approach according to which the role of the decision maker is 
generating responsibility. At the same time it does not lead to absurd conclusions in other 
contexts – my claim that de dicto harms should be considered rests upon the fact that 
before conception only the de dicto reading is available and thus I am not committed to 
claiming that, when notion of de re harm is available, we should still consider de dicto 
harms. In the non-identity cases once we can start talking of concrete individual to whom 
we can refer in de re mode morality starts making different kinds of claims. We can start 
discussing responsibilities, harms, benefits etc. toward that particular individual. 
The de dicto account is also flexible enough to accommodate subtle differences in 
cases of bad events and bad conditions. For example it explains the difference between 
why it would be permissible for Betty to have a blind child while not so for Wilma – by 
conceiving a blind child Wilma does make her child de dicto worse off, while Betty (who 
has no alternatives for “her child”) does not. The transitivity principle that Boonin (2014: 
198-199) suggests should work in this case can be rejected on the basis that Betty (and 
Jane who decided not to conceive a healthy child) have to make a decision whether to 
become parents at all, while Wilma is deciding when to have a child. However not all 
disabilities will be so severe and not all bad situations so bad that they would count as 
making the de dicto individual worse off. Since one should set priority on avoiding de 
dicto harm in the non-identity cases then it is context sensitive what counts as harm. For 
example in modern society short-sightedness, though uncomfortable to have, is still 
relatively easily compensated for and therefore does not affect the wellbeing of possible 
individual to the extent that we would have to try to avoid it at all cost, even though we 
might agree that it would be better to have a full vision.  
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7. Conclusion 
In the first chapter of this thesis I presented examples of different non-identity cases 
that I have been using throughout this paper. In the second chapter I introduced previous 
attempts to solve the non-identity problem, I followed Boonin’s (2008, 2014) breakdown 
of the argument that gives rise to the non-identity problem to five premises and one 
implausible conclusion. Proposed solutions usually involve rejection of one premise and 
critique was provided why they are unsatisfactory in human and/or animal cases. Boonin 
himself accepts the implausible conclusion, which in effect gives us no tools to take into 
account future generations. In my view Boonin’s “nothing-wrong” solution only highlights 
the problematic situation underlined by the non-identity problem: many of our current 
moral frameworks that are concentrated on present individuals do not give us the tools to 
take into account future individuals.  
Before proposing my own way to account for future individuals in the context of 
the non-identity problem, I discussed another intuition at play in some animal non-identity 
cases in the fourth chapter: that the entire breed or the species might have been harmed. 
Harm on the level of the population changes focus of some animal non-identity cases, 
allowing to better address Palmer’s (2012) critique. While this kind of harm may seem to 
count as harming a third party and not the individual brought into existence, then when 
considering reproduction, an individual cannot be viewed as totally separate from the 
population it belongs to. This kind of approach has not been proposed in the context of the 
non-identity problem and adds another layer to the non-identity cases, however it does not 
block the non-identity argument in all the scenarios, since non-identity problem may arise 
also on the level of the population. 
I have argued for accepting a de dicto reading of the future individuals in the non-
identity cases. My argument rests on the fact that at the moment of making an identity-
fixing decision no other understanding of future individuals is available, so when we 
inquire about whether the identity-fixing decision is morally problematic or not we have to 
adopt a de dicto understanding. De dicto understanding does not only accommodate 
different identities of future individuals but also the different numbers of potential 
individuals in different outcomes, which are also not fixed and not known to the decision-
maker. The aim of the paper was not strictly speaking to solve the non-identity problem, so 
it did not reconstruct the argument, but it did argue that adopting the de dicto meaning 
would block the argument. Whatever else we would like to say in addition – adopting 
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different account of harm, stipulating the conclusion or appeal on the right – the de dicto 
meaning should be adopted first. 
 I also suggested that adopting a de dicto mode of referring to future individuals 
allows bringing the beginning of the relationship between procreator and future individual 
in some instances to a time before conception, and thus the responsibilities that such 
relationship produces could begin before conception. The latter principle is an expansion 
of familiar principle that parents have special responsibilities toward their children and can 
be phrased as: one is responsible for the life one creates. De dicto reading will make it 
possible to consider harms to the future generations by making them de dicto worse off, 
and in some relationships such harm may be sufficient to consider the act to be wrong. 
Some of the further potential objections and limitations of this view were discussed in the 
sixth chapter. 
Returning to the global warming example presented in the beginning of the thesis – 
accepting de dicto meaning would allow us to account for the future individuals, whoever 
they might be and no matter how many of them there might be. We could still say that by 
choosing to go on with current policies we are making future individuals, whoever they 
are, worse off than they would have been if we would choose more sustainable practises. 
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8. Summary 
In this thesis I have argued for adopting the de dicto meaning of future individuals 
in non-identity cases. Although many philosophers adopt de re meaning in the non-identity 
cases, there is no de re reading available before making an identity-fixing decision, we can 
only start taking de re individuals into account after conception. Adopting the de dicto 
meaning is the only way to take the future individuals – people and animals – into account 
before their identity is fixed while making decisions that will concern them. I have 
proposed that in situations where there is only the de dicto meaning available and where 
decision maker has special responsibilities toward de dicto, the de dicto harm might be 
significant enough to make the decision or action at least morally problematic. 
To better account for the animal examples introduced by Clare Palmer, I suggested 
to bring another layer to the non-identity cases and consider harms on the population level 
where appropriate. While considering harms to population (species or breed) might appear 
to consider harms to a third party, in procreative context, the individual cannot be viewed 
as totally separate from the populations they belong to.  
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